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CoNGRES~, }

IIOUSE Oli' REPHESENTATIVES.

1st Session.

HI~Pon:r
14!>~.

{ No.

FORFEITURE LANDS NOHTllERN PACIFIC HAILROAD
CO.MPANY.

A.PIUL

:3, 1888.-Recommitte(l to the Committee on Puhlie Lands and ordered to he
printed.

Mr. McH.AE, from the Committee on Public Lands, submitted the following

REPORT:
[To accompany hill H. R 9151.]

The Committee on the Public Lands, to wl10m were referred H. R.
1303, 2000, all(1 4432, for the forfeiture of lands granted to the Northern
Pacific Hailroac.l Uornpany, report the same back, with the recommendation that they be laid on the table and that the accompanying biJI
be passed by the Bouse. The bill is as follows:
A BILL to forfeit certain lands granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and for other
purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and HouBe of Bep1·eBentaUveB of the United State8 of America
in Cougres8 a88tmtbled, That all the lauds granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company by an act approved July 2, A. D. 1864, except such as are adjacent to alHl
coterminous with road constructed prior to July 4, A. D. 1879, with the right of way
through the remainoor of the route, including all necessary grounds for station buildings, shops, depots, switchcB, side-tracks, turn-tahl<>s, a.nd, excepting also all lauds
included within the limits of any village, town, or city, he, and the same are hereby,
declared forfeited and restored to tho pn hlic domain, because of tho failure of the ~:;aid
company to perform the conditions on which the grant was made.
S1w. 2. That the forfeiture herein declared shall not extend to lands adjacent to
and coterminous with completed road sold uy said company prior to Jan nary 1, 1888,
to bona fide purchasers for value, hut the title to such lands arc hereby cou1irmed to
such purchasers, t.heir heirs, or assigns, upon condition that all persons claiming tllo
benefit of this section, shaH, within ono year after tho pasBagc of this act, make and
file before the register awl rccei vor of tho propor land office, su hject to an appeal to
the Commissiouer of tho General Lai.1d Oflicc, proof of tho good faith, ~onsideration,
date, and exton t of his or her purehase ; aud after hearing such proofs and iu vestigating each case the register and receiver shall determine whether any allege(l .pnrclmso was in fact made in good faith, for a good and valuable consideration, vrior to
J:,muary 1, 1888, aud shall note tho finding in each case on tho records of tho locallaud office, and shall thereafter certify the same to tho Commissioner of the General
Land Oflice.
S~<:c. 3. That all settlers upon any of the lands forfeited by this act arc hereby permitted :uul authorized to acquire title to not exceeding 160 acres in each case, as a
homesteall, under and pursuant to the laws relating thereto, and in makiug final proof
of such homestead, the ~:;ettler shall be allowed for the time he has already resided
upon and cultivated the same.

The act making the grant to the said company was approved July
2, 1864 (13 Stat. L., 365), and the grant was the largest of all the
grants made to aid in the construction of railroads. It extended from
Lake Superior to Puget Sound, a distance of over 2,000 miles, and
embraced all the odd-numbered sectionH for 20 miles aloHg the entire
line iu the State:;; and :.>o miles in the Territories through which the
road was located, with iudemuity within 10 additional miles. The in-
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demnity limits were enlarged to 30 miles (16 Stat. L., 278). So the
belt of lauds actually a:fl'ecte<l was 40 miles in width in the States and
80 miles in the Territories.
1.'he committee think the grant was one in prwsenti upon conditions
subsequent, and that for tbe failure to perform the conditions a forfeiture should be declared except as to such lauds as are adjacent to aud
coterminous with road constructed prior to July 4, 1879, with proper
protection to town sites, bona-fide purchasers without limit, all(]. actu:.tl
settlers to the extent of 160 acres in each case.
The third section of the said act, which declared ~he purpose anti
:fixed the limit of the grant to the said company, is as follows:
SEc. 3 . .And be it further enacted, That there ue and is horeuy granted to the Northoru
PaciJic Railroad Company, its successors and asl:ligns, for tho purpose of aiUing in
the cou~;truction of said railroa.d aud telegraph line to the Pacific coast, all(l to !>ecuro
tho ::;afo and speedy tr:1llsportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, aud
1m blic sLorcs, over the route of said line of raihvay, every alternate section of pu lJ.
lie laud, not mineral, de~:~ignated by odd number~:~, to the amount of twenty altemato
f:lectious per mile, on each side of said railroad line, as said company way adopt,
through tho Territories of t.lw United State::; aml ten altemate sect io11s of lau<ll•l'l'
milo, on each side of saill railroad, whenever it passes through any State, atHl wl•eucvcr, on tho line thereof the United St~ttes have full title, not reserve<l, ~:>old, grante<l,
or ot!Jerwiso appropriated, and free from pre-empt ion or other clai mH or righ I H at tlw
tune tho line of said road is definitely fixetl and the plat thereof lile<l iu tho oflice of
the Cornru1s::;ioner of the General Land Office;. and whenever, prior to said Lenn, any
of ~:~aid sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, soltl, reserved, occupied
by homcstcau settlers, or pre-empted, or otherwise dispol:led of, other laud::; shall hu
~:~elccteu hy ::;aid compa,ny in lieu thereof, under the direction of the ~ecret~try of tho
Interior, in alternate sections all(l designato<l by odd numbers, not more than 10
miles ueyond tho limits of said alternate Hectious.

The fifth section declared how the road should be constructed, autl
protected the Government as to rates of transportation and telegraph
t:~ervice:
SI<~C. 5. That the said Northern Pacific Railroad shall be constructed in a substantial awl workmanlike ruanner, with all t.he necessary draws, culverts, bridges, viaducts, crossings, turnouts, sta.tions, and watering placeB awl all other appurteumweH,
including furniture and rolling stock, cq ua,l in aU respects to railroalb of the iirl:lt cla~;s,
wlwn prepared for business, with rails of ijhe uost quality, manufactured from American iron. All(l a uniform gauge shall be established thronghoHt the eutiro lcugth of
tlH~ road.
And there shall be const.rnctcd a telegraph liue of the moHt Hll b~t~mtial
and approve{} description, to be operated along the entire line: l'rol'ided, That Haiti.
company sha.llnot clutrgc the Government higher rates than they do iJl(livicluals 1i>r
like tmnsportatiou and telegraph service. And it shall be tho duty of the Nortllcru
PaeiJic Uailroad Company to permit auy other railroad which shall be authorizL•Il to
he built by tho United State::; or uy the legi~:~lature of any Torritory or State in whiclt
the same may be situated, to form runniug conuectiom; with it, ou fair aud equitablu
terms.

'fhe :first and most important condition of the grant is in section 8
of the said act. It is as follows:
SEc. 8. A n£1 be it ju1·tl!m· enacted, That each and every grant, right, and pri vih'go
herein arc ~;o malh' and given to and accepted uy HaidNort.hern PaciHcHailroacl Uolllpany, upou and ~m bject to the follow·ing condition::;, namely: That the said compauy
Hhall comuwnco the work on Haill road wi! ltin two years from tho :tpproval of this aet.
hy tho President, and ::;hall complete not le~;s than 50 miles per year after tho Heco111l
,Ytlttr, aud shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete tho whole road by the 4th day
of July, A. D. Hl76 .

.A further condition was imposed by seetion 9:
SEC. 9. And be it jurthe1· enacted, That the United States make the several COIHlitioued grants herein and tha,t the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company accept the
same upon the further condition that if the company make any l'reach of the cotHlitions hereof and allow the same to continuo for upwards of one year, then in such
caso·, at any time hereafter, the United State~;, by its Congress, may do any and all
acts :mel things which may be needful aud necessary to insure a speedy com1)Jetiou
of sa1d road.
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, By the joint resolutiou of May 7, 1866 (14 Stat., 355), the time for the
completion of the whole road was extended two years, and afterwardR
section 8 was amended so as to read July 4, 1877 (15 Stat., 255). The
Secretary of the Interior, on the 11th day of June, 1879 (pp. 10U-111),
<leciderl that tlw time wa:-:; Pxtended to Jnly 4, 1879. This rlecision ap}Wars to ht' eo1 r(~ct, aud Ho the committee haH adopted that date as the
expiration of the period of limitation.
\Vork was not commeiiCPd by Raid company in two years from the
npproYal of tlln gT:wting aet. Nothing was done, aud no lirH~ ]()(~a tPtl
for Hix: J ears; uot until authority waH given to mortgage anc.l i~-;sne ho1uls
by the resolution~ approvf'd Marel1 1, 18G9 (15 Stat.~ :346), and May :n,
1870 (16 Stat., 378). After Lhc~:;e reRolntions mortgages were iHstwd,
according to the showing of the company, covering the lan(lR, aR follow A:
(1) 'l'ho mortgage of July 1, 1870, now ropresentod by the profi.1rre•l stock of t.he
company.
(2) Tho Missouri Division mortgage of March 1, 187!),
(:~) Tho Pend d'Oreille mortgage on that. portion of the line of September 1, 187!).
(4) Tlte general mortgage of .Juno 1, 18Hl, at the rate of $~G,OOO per mile, now the
first mortgage on the greatt•r portion of tlu• main li1w.
(5) Tho second mortgage of 1\ovondJc.r 20, JHH:~, for $~0,000,000.
The outstanding mortga.g o bon•ls of the company were as follows, hy July :30, 1Hrl!"),
1he close of last financial yoa.r:
Getwral fin;t. mortgagc bonds . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . $4:~, 40::, 000
Gt•nera.l scco11<l mortgage bonds ...•....•...........••.... • ...•..•.... _. lH, H:-,7, 000
MiHsonri Division mortgage bonds . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • .. .. . .. • .. . . . .
2, 2:t~,:.oo
Penll d'Oreille DiviHiou mortgage bonds................................
:~, :!40, 000
67,

S!t~,

GUO

In addition to this there was i~s ued preferred stock to the amouut of
$38,610,584. Tn violation of the tenth sectio11 of tbe act, whieh (leclaretl "that all tlle people of the United States shall bave the right to
Ruhscribe to tlle stock," it appears that J. Gregory Smith and other aRsociates entered into an agreement with the following provisions:
WitnessethFirst. That each subscriber or party of the second part shall pa.y, on (lema.ntl of
saicl Smith, the snm of $8,500 for each one-twelfth part or Aha.re in said enterprilin,
n.ncl in that proportion for any lesser part so hy himself Hnbscribed for; and npon
payment of said amonnt each subscriber aforesaid shall, and he does thereby, heeomP
jointly interested with said Smith and his a.ssocia,tes, according to the numlwr of
shares or parts of Hhares HO l'm bscrilwd for by him, in the charter and franehiHe of the
Nortlwm Pa.cilic Railroad, with all its rights, powers, privileges, and immnnit.iPH.
Second. It iH mutually agreed by a.nd between the parties that the beRt effort.:-; of
each and all shall be given to obtain from CongreRs the passage of a. l1ill granring
aid to the said company tor the constmct.ion of said road and 1olngra.ph, a.n•l for Hueh
further logit>lation as may he needed; a.nd that each party shall contribute according
to tho interet>t that h e hol<ls, the necessary funds for that purpose; sa.hl motlOYH n.1ul
expenses to be paid a.nd incurred mHlor t.he direction of a committee to be appoint«-d
for t.ha.t purpose.
Third. It is further agreed that each share in tho enterprise shall be entitlo•l to
one director in the company, to be <•lt'ctcd a.t the next annual election of tho boar•l,
antl that in tho mean timo the vacancioH that can now he obtained by tho resignation
of pn1sent members ma.y be filled fmm such parties from n.mong the snbscri hers her·eto
as lllay be by them deHignated.
Fo~ntl1. That as soon as the ncceAsary legislation from Congress can he obtain<'ll a
mPctmg of the subscribers shall he l1ol•l a.t an early da.y to rnako sneh further organization as m:t) h<' advisable, with a view to tlw commencement of 1.hc work or construction of said roatl and Ancnri ng tho land p;rantecl hy 11lw clmrt•·r.
Fifth. Each party hereto may Anhdivitlc his interest a.econling t.o his own choieo,
the snhdiviHion and addition of new part.ies, however, not to change the modo n.nd
manner of representation in the managonwnt as set fort.h above.

Tbe Ron. Charles S. VoorhPcs. the Df'1•'gatc from WaRhington Territory, in cliHen~o;Ring- this wic•kf'cl agrN'IlH\!1 t and tlte gf~llt'T'a 1 p11rpo~p of
tlte iueoqwrators to defeat the ol>jeet aud purposes of tile act tlwt gave
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the company being, stated, in an able and well-con8idered speech delivered in the House of Hepreseutatives July 26, A. D. 18Su, thatOn the lOth day of .January, 18G7, the above agreement was oxecnte<l, which told
the story of the corruption which presided at tho birth of thit~ "benevolent Jtlouopoly."
From 1.his agreement it will he seen that the first st.ops taken hy thi:-; corporation
were t~teepe<l in fraud and infamy. From the very outset it (ll'voloptHl int.o a eom
bina.tiou for the purposes of individnal a).!;gl':tJHli,-;omcnt., hy moHt. quostional•lo mot.ltodR, and each :-;,:JCceecling management ha:-; religiously a.llhercd to thiH canlinal principle of the organizatiOn.
.
Until tho 20th day of May, 1869, the records show that tho holders of t.lwso proprietary intcrnstH faithfully and zealously waited for something to t.nrn np. On that
date an agrnemcnt was executed with Jay Uooko & Co. looking to Rome :o;nhstnntial
result.
Five years ha.cl dapsed since tho granting of the charter by Congrf'ss, clnring
which 1.illH'· tlu~ projPct.orR of this enh'rprise had h<>c•n HO hnt-~ily occupied in an ~~Jfort
to pnrcha~:>c the CongTeHs of the Unite(] t-\tatPR that. tl11ly ha.clno time to cwon n1tPmpt
a eoruplia.nco with tho terms of the act of lr'(i4, nor it-~ thnro any PviclenC(' that tht'.Y
ever eont.emplat.Nl lloing RO until it bf'camf' C(~ltain t.hat ~-;uch contplianeP woultl rt•sult
in Lht•ir ill(lividnal advancement.
Au f'lltPrpriHn which is fonnclf'<l as the records show this to have been can, at no
stage of it~• oxisteucc, ho said to be characterizecl by any cl(•grPI' of lwnesty or goocl
faith.
In adclit.ion to tho corrupt tendencies of this corporation thus evidenced, there has
never been that degree of goo(L faith in the cmJHtrnetion of tho roall wllich wonlil
ent.itlo it to tho special conHidera.tion of Uongros:-;. Tho work of' cor•strnctiou w:tll
not cwon hegnn nntillH70, Hix y<':trt-1 a.ftf'r the granting hy Congress of this magnilirent chartor. Congn•ss origin:tlly inten<lt•d tlrn.t tlw road shonltl be co11strncted as
tho n'snlt of the sale of the s~oek of tho corporation. This intention is m~ulc maniicHt hy tho provisions of soct.iou 10 of the act of ll:lG4, that "no rnortgagc or construction houds Hha.ll ever be iRsne<l hy A:tid company on said road, or lllOrtgago or li<'n
m:Mle in any way except hy tho comwnt of the CongJ'PHs or the United St.a.teH."
lt is cviclent, however, that Lhere IH'ver (\Xi~-;tt•d a purpose 011 the part of 1.he managers of this "gift enterprise" to construct the road within the scope of thiR wclldelincd intention of Congress.
On the 31At 1lay of May, lr.l70, they procurccl from Congress permission to martgagc
tlwir f'ranchiHe an(l other property interPHtH, an(l tlwn, aiHl thon only, was any HubHtantial stnp taken toward the accomplishment of tho l'•'Hll Lt foreRhadowcd in the act
or July 2, 18()4. Ev<'ry mile of this long line of roaclltat> been constrnctetl wir,ll tho
proceeds of the sale of tho mortgage hoiL(lH coutmnplated ·in the act of May :n, 1870.
The indi vidu:tl capital of not one of the projectors of the enterprise has ever boon for
an ·in:-;tant jeopardized or mu.langered.
The policy of this company has always been of such a eharacter, however, v.s to
lead to tho conclut~ion that corporation conAt.rnction has been wholly nnahle to diA·
tinguish between the ' 1 public iuterct>t awl welfare" and the p<~cnniary advanccnwnt
oft.l10 ilHlividualmemb(\l'H of the corporation by wha.tev('r methods. Manifold illnstmtions of this policy mi~ht be given. In :t Hingle illustration, however, to which I
shall direct att•1ntion, will he found all the indicia of highway robLery ~mil piracy Oh
the high seas, sulllciently marked to enl}lha-,ize the company'A entire policy.
More than twenty yo:trs ago, when t.ho Hnggestion of traltHcont.irwntal railroatl
communic;ttion was regarded as the ofl'spring of the theorist and the dreamer, a fow
hardy spirit~;, who had picketed tho outposts of civilization, plantt'll a pioneer town
in the Yakima Valley in central Washington Territory, and called it Yakima. City.
Year hy year they 7-ealonsly gnarded their isolatecl offspring until they saw it deyclop
into a t.hriving, beautiful town, tho commercial center of ·an exceedingly rich agricnltnral region Under their progrcssivo touch it became the largest town within a
ra.clius of 100 miles, and assnmed Anfficient importance to justify the Territorial Jcgislatnre in clothing it with all tho functions of a city hy au act of incorporation.
From the beginning the Northern Pacific Railroad Company had given the inhabitants of this little city every assnrancc that the coming of the roacl meant p(\rmancnt
prosperity for them. The clouds of frontier deprivation were to he rolled back, aml
the sunshine of an assnrerl and permanent growth was to envelop tho results of more
than twenty years of frugal indiistry and toil. Many made modest investments, from
scant means, in the town, with the purpose of realizing the legitimate profits certain
to attend the arrival of railroad facilities. In this instance, as in every other, however, they who placed any reliance in tho promises of this corporation found themselves tl1e victims of Pnnic faith.
Up t.o the time or the completion of the road to Yakima City it was supposed that
tho Northern Pacific Railroad Company bad sounded all the depths and shoals of cor-
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por:ttc infamy ancl rapacity. It rmnainecl for it, ho-wC'vcr, to emphasize, in its contlnet,
the most heartless, rn t,hle::>s, and uanmable transaction over known to the full history
of corporate speculation. To deliberately set on foot and push forward a speculation
in ruined homes, shattered fortunes, and broken heads re<JHires such colossal alHl
gigantic scoundrclism that the mind instinctively shrinks from its contemplation.
And yet this is just what the Northern Pacific Railroad Company did in dealing with
Y:tldnm City.
When tho time came for striking the blow, they pushed their roa<l throngh tho
corp.:>rato limits of tho ohl pioneer town of Yakima City to a point a110nt 4 milE's
ht'yOIHl an<l there located a town npon one of t,he o!ld sections cmbract•<l ·within tho
limits of tlw grant RO long since forfeited by tho comp:wy, antl call<'d jt Nort.l• Yakima.
Certainly no one will seriously contend that Con gross in it.H wi ld<,:-;L flig-ht K or imagination ev<>rcoJttt>mplatotl that its bounty shouhl l1ccomo such an engine of oppression
alHl <LeAtmction as it thus developed under the skillful mmlipnlation or 1.ltis <·o•npany.
Tho fuct that this move carried consternation into many a hard-eantc<l home was not
sufficient to tnrn them from their nefarious purpose.
The fact that in pnrsning Rnch a course they a<lvcrt.iAod thomAelvC's :1!'\ t.lw ll.onnmontal liars of tho ecntnry was insufficient to deter them from tho infa,my. 'l'lto fact
that hankrnptcy amlruin hovered over many a household as tho rcsnlt, of tho sncCCHH of tho assanlt upon tho old town sr«'mod to urge them to r<'JH'\\'('cl <•ll'ort. It
mattered not to them that the ol<l town bad been made sacred by tho associat.ious
of nearly a goueration; that wi1 hin its precincts childrf'n bad grown to man hootl
aml womanhood; that within its quiet churchyard "the rndo forefathers of tho h:tml~t sloop;" and in short, that all the tender and beautiful memories of honw, both
joyonH and sad, wore rtulely trampl~(l upon and uprooted.
Seemingly fearful lest, with any encouragPment whatever, tho feelin~ of deyotion
to the home of nearly a generation might indnco a resistance to this scJwnw or pillage and plnndor, the order was i~;sue<L to afforcl tho ol<l t.own no railroatl JaeiJitii'A
wbatovf'l'. Every })assenger residing in Yakima City who was forco<l to ride ovl'r the
roall was compelled to go to North Yakima to take tho train, notwithst.anding tho
fact that every train passed directly through the cunter of tho oM 1.own.
People walked about :ts in the shallow of a great bereavement and cnrA<'<l tho eyil
hour in which Congress chartered so villainous a combination. A more <laring,
shameless outrage has no place in the wide raugc of corporate villainy.
It is marvelous that in the face of such. an exhibit as tl1iH any otw can he fonml to
insist that this corporation is entitled to any considorat.iou snvo that which lwlongH
to the common marauder upon tho 1n·operty of others. It is entitletl to uo considera.ti on at the bands of honest people.

This is a strong arraignment, but it appear::) to he Rnstaine<l hy the
facts.
The following official table shows the dates of the location, extent of
withdrawal, the length of road, amount completed in time, an<l anwnnt
;yet uncompl('tC(l:
lhtto of dcfinito location.
GPnPral nmtP :
Month nf MontrPal River, Wiseonsin, to RPd River of tho North, ·Sept. 15, 1870.
Minne~ota, .Aug. 1a, 1870.
EaHtorn boundary of Washington Territory, via valley of Colnm hi a. Sept. 20, 1!l70 ; NoY. 21, 1R70;
Rivur, to intl'rnational boundary, Aug. 13, 1870. ·
l<'eh. 10. Ul72; l•'(•h. 14, 11'72;
S<•pt. 20, 1870; I•'eh. 9, 11'73,
allll Feb. 14, 1872.
Through Minnm;ota, Oct. 2, 1R70 . ...•.•..••.• . ..................... Nov. 7. 1R70.
ltrd River of the North 1o the mouth of the Walla Walla River, M:ar.30, 1872; Apr. 22, 1872;
Washington, :Feb. 21, 1872.
Apr. Hi, 1872; Oct.. 28, IR76;
:Mar. 30, 1872, and Apr. Hi,
1872.
Lako Prml d 'Oreille, Idaho, to Tacoma, Wash. (branch) , Aug. Oct. 6, 1873, and NoT". 1,1873.
20, 187:l.
:Month nt Rnakc River to Tacoma, Nov. 24, 1876 .................. .. None.
Twin \Ve1IH to Tacoma, .Tune 11,1879 . ............................ . ,Tuly 3, 1879.
Dcfiu.w loca,,hm :
,Juncwm with Lake Suprrior and Mississippi Railroa(l to Red Doc. 12, 1871.
l~l\'or of the North at lfm·~o, Dak., Nov. 20, 1871.
F:trgo to msmarck, l>ak. , :May 26, 1873 . . ............•...•.......... .Tune 11, 1873.
Kalama to Tenino, SoJ)t. 13, 1873 .................................. .. Jan. 21, 1874.
'!'(luiJw to Tacoma, May 14,1874 .......... . .. .. .................. . Nov. 12,1874, andJnno30, 1R75.
Bismarck to Little Missouri River, .July 20,1880 .... . ............. . Aug. 23,1880.
Little MiRsouri River to mouth of Glt>mlivo Creek, Oct. 25, 1880 .. . Nov. 29, 1R80, nml Sopt.29, 1R83.
Wallula to Spokane Falls, Oct. 4, 1880 ............................. . Nov. 13, IR80; Nov. 17, IHHO;
Nov.1'l, 1880; Aug.1G, 1881,
and Nov. 29, 1880.
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Date of definite location.

Date and extent of withdrawal.

I Definite location-Continued.

Glendive Creek to TongueRivnr, June ~5. 1881. ......••.......... RPpt. 29, 1883.
Tongue River to eastern bonn<l::try of Crow R(>St>rve, ,Jnne 25, 1881. Oct. 8, 188:J.
Through Crow RoservP., June 27, 1881 ............ ................ . Nov. 14, 1883; .Tmw 8, 188:1,
an<l June !J, 188:1.
r Spokane Falls, Wash., to Lake Pcmll ll'Oreillo, Idaho, Aug. 30, 18RL .Jnnll9, 1884, ancl.Jan. 7, ll'Rf'.
Last crossing nf Yollowstono Rivor (wc·stcrn lwunclary of Crow J June 8, 1llll3, aud ,Tunc' 0, 1o~l.
Reserve) to Little Blackfoot River, ,July G, 188::!.
·
Little Blac,]< foot lUver to southern bocmdary of 1!'latlwad RoRorY!', ,July 30, 1883, and Jnl.} 31, 1SR3.
July G, 1882.
Junction with I-ako Superior :mel MissisHippi ltailroad in Minne- ,Tau. 5, 1883; Juno lR, 18R:l;
sota toT. 47 N. , R. 2 \V., \Vi~:~·onHin, July G, 188:!.
Oct. 11, 188:1; ,Jan.:,, lRx::;
.June 22, 18H3, and Oct. :w,
1883.
Portland, Oregon. to Kalama, Wash., SPpt. 22, 1882 .............. . ,Jan. 30, 1888.
La.l<e Peml <l'Oroillo, Idaho, to mouth of Misl:muri lUver, Mon- Ht'pt. 1, 1884; Fch. 20, 1885, anti
tana, DPc., 12, 188:l.
.fan. 7, 1888.
Through l<'latlw:td Reservo to month ofMisflouri Rivnr, Juno8, 1RB3 R••pt. 25, 1881, ancl Jan. 7, 1888.
Inilial point at .Ashland, \ViH., wPst 50 miles, Nov. 24, lll&L •..... J<'eb. 3, 1887.
Yakima to .Ainsworth, June 29, 1H!:l3 ............................. . ,Jan. !i, 18R5; Jan. 8, 1885, a111\
J·au. H, 1H85.
Yakima to Swank Crc~k. ::\fay 24-, 1884 .. ......................... . . Ja11. 6, 18R5; Jn.n. R, 1885, mal
Jan. H, 1885.
Tacoma to Routh Prairie, 'Mar. 26, 1884 . ...... . ................... . No,•. 28, 1HH4, :mel DPc. I, 18Rt
Sonth PrairiH to E:t!!lo Gorge, St>pt. 3, 1884 ....................... . Nov. 28, 1884, ancl Ike. 1, 1884.
Swank Creek to E:tglo Gorge, Doc. 8, 1884-. .........•............ . Jan. 7, 188!:!.
'

Length.

Main line:
Wisconsin .................. ........
Minnesota................... ........
Dakota............... .............. .
Montnna ............................
Iclaho ..•....•............•...•......
Washington........................ .
Oregon ..............................
Cascade Rranch, Washington . . • • • • • . . . .

UncomCompletNl Complrtocl plotcd at
within
after
d:tfP ('llfire
Nowuntime pr•···
timo -pro- I'O:t(l ShitHlcJ (•ontpii'!Pcl.
have holm
scri he d.
•scrih!•tl.
C0111pleted.
Jlfile.~.

.ilfiles.

]files.
78.50 ...... ...•..
237
228
:l75.BH
196.4
780
.•••...•....
!JO
•••••• ...•••
511.10
106.1

78.50
9
170.58
780
00
180

I

"lfiles.
78.50
9
170.58
780
00
405

.MileR.

.•.... ......
.......... ..
...• ........
........... .
...•........
225

2,1::::~ ~-~~~~~-- -1,3:~~~-1,5~::~: ~------~~~···
153. 93 . • . • • • . • . . . .

151. 50

-

--·--

I

--

153. 03

--

. 43

-

-

Main lino af! finally locat.!'tl and ()onstrnct.e<l oxten(lfl from AAhlancl, \Vis., to \Vallnla Jnnetion, \Vash
1,741A~ntii~>H, ancl fmm Pqrflarul,Orclgon, to '!'acoma, \VaHh., 142.i0milns. Compll'tecl from Nort!IC'rn
J>acific ,Junetion, Minu., to HiHmarek, D:tk., 424.4 miles, aml from Kalama t.o Ta.eoma., \Vash., IO!i.l
Inilrs.
Roacl Rtill nnrompletocl botwePn Wallula Junction, ·wash., a,Jl(l l'ortlan!l, Oregon. Compa11y useR
road of Oreg. on Railway and Navigation Comp:t11y IH'twoen said points.
C~~~!£o~i~~~~~i!~~ Cascado.Branch remaining uncomiJlotod (2.43 miles) consists of tunnel through

By ord(~r of the Secretary of the Interior, Aug-ust 15, 1H87, the indcm.
11ity lands were restored and none of such withdrawals are now in force.
The g-rant has not hecn completely adjnsted, hut 1 ,031,031. 78 acres b:tY('
been patented. The company has sold 6,:J2!l,l40.61 for the aggreg-at<'
snm of $22,614,405. The average price per acre for all sales to date is
$3.47.

A bill substantially like this was reported from the Committee on the
Public h .t nds in the J.i orty-ninth Congress, and the ]pg-al prineinles involved were so clearly prm:;ente<l by lion. Barclay Henley, of California,
in the report he made for the committee, that the argument is adopted
by the vresent committee:
1

The consi1lern.tion of the case involves two general n.lHl leading flllCstions: Pir~>t,
the power of Co11gwss to d<'clare :t gra.nt of public lands forfeite(l for breach of condition subsequent; second, wht•ther, this power hei11g establiHhed, t.lwre are any features in this particular case excepting the grant from the general rule.
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The power of Congress to declare forfeited a grant of tho public lands, made to
either a corporation or a State, by an act containing a clause proviuing that the lands
should revert upon failure to build the road within a specified time, is established beyond all controversy by repeated decisions of the Snpremo Court.
. It is specifically so held in United States VB. Repentigny (5 Wall., 211) and Schulenburg VB. Harriman (21 Wall., 44).
Following those cases is another, which even more unequivocally defines the power
of Congress in this regard. In Farnsworth VB. Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company (92 U. S., 66), the court, considering the qnestion, said:
"A forfeiture hy the State of an interest in lands and connected franchiseR, grantf'tl
for the constrnctiou of a pnhlic work, may he declared for non-compliancn wit~ h th11
co111litions annexed to their grant or their possession, when forfeiture is providetl hy
statnte, withont judicial proceedings to 1Lscertain and determine tho fa.iluro of the
grantee to perform tho conditions."
Following these authoritative expositions of the law, as well as the rcaAons and
scmse of tlw principle in vol vcd, yonr committee have uniformly held that jnri~H1 ict ion
existe<l in <Jongress to dcclaro these grants forfeited and have reported severaJ hills to
accomplish that purpose, some of wluch have already passed tho Honse. We adhere
to this position in the case UJHler consideration.
Your committee arc also clearly of the opinion that there is nothing in the provisions
of t.he Northern Pacific act which take~:~ it out of the category of grants upon condition
subsequent, liahlo to forfeitnre for breach of condition.
The qnestion turns upon a consideration of sections:~. !l, 8, and 9, herein before q notec1.
The company claim tha.t they constitute an absolute clcdication of the lands to t.l1o
JHHposo of constructing tho road; that there is no condition Anbseqnont, what.eHr,
and that the only power in the United States is the po\vor through Congress to adopL
such measures as may be necessary to insure the completion of t.hc road, in case tho
company does not build it.
On tho other hanrl, your committee regard this construction as utterly untenable,
and arc clearly of tho opinion1. That section 8 of the act declares a condition sub seq non t, viz, that tho ro~td shall
be completed within a certain time, upon breach of which the grantor may declare a
forfeiture.
2. That section 9 is in no way repugnant to sectionS, but while embracing all that
is included therein, anu to that extent perhaps cumulative, iA also, in comwction wiLh
section 5, a declaration of further and atldi tional contli tions sulmeq neu t, for breach of
which Congress may interfere to protect tho rights oft.he UnitPcl Statns.
:t That under either of saitl sections, or hoth together, the United Sta.tf's, hy Congress, has the right to declare the grant forfeited for failure to build tho roacl within
the Limitation.

I.
SCiction 8 is perfectly plain in tho language used and tho pnrpoAo contemplated. It
clPelaws in so many words that the grant made is given hy the Uni1f'tl Sl ateA and accepted hy the company "subject to the following con<litiom;, namely, t.hat the saicl
company * " * shall construct, CC]_uip, furnish, andcompllltethewholeroatl,"Mc.
This is too plain for any com;truction Congress intomlofl to proviclo, anc1 did provide,
that tho road should be complotecl within a certain time, an<l tl1at that Ahoulcl he a
condition of the grant. If a condition, the grant is determinable upon its breach, a(;
tho option of tho grantor.
.
The argument of the company rests upon the alH:;once of express words declaring a
reversion in case of the breach. That, in the judgment of your committee, was
entirely nnnecessary in order to create an estate npon condition snbsoqnont. The
estate, so conditioned, is created by declaring the condition, not hy deela.ring the
resnlt of its breach. The latter, re-f'ntry or its eqnivale11t, followR as a matter of
legal f'lrect. Every lawyer knows the result of a breach of COIHlition tmhHt'qnent,
and the statement of that result in any grant ad<1s nothing to t.he proviouA description of tho eHtate created. The laucl docs "revert." hy operation of law upon tho
hreael1 being enforced by re-entry or its equivalent; hnt tho right to that rcH•ntry
tlf'pends upon no express provisions that the land shall revert. It stands upon t.he
condition declared and its hrf'ach. Upon this point we quote from the repOl't of the
Pnhlic Lands Committee, made at this session of Conp;resA upon the l1ill forfeit.ing
the Texas Pacific land grant, reported to the Honse hy Jntlge Paysou:
"In otlJCr won1A, generally state11, tho distinguished connst~l for the company declare~:~ that in law the power to declare a forfeiture of a gr:wt made on COIHlitiou snhsf'qnent for breach of tho condition mnst be reserved to t.he grantor hy express terms
in the aet of making the gr:m t., or it. does not exist.
"No authority waR protlncetl to the commit.ten nxccpt t.ho statement of the attorueys assl'rting this extraordi11ary doctrine in Hllpporl of it. ; hut t.he interest beiug so
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great, we have examined the books on tho qncst.ion, and are not able to find a single
authority in support of the propositioll, and we believe none can be found.
"On the contrary, vVashbnrn on Real Property (vol. 2, 3d ed., p. 15) asserts the
rule to be: 'Where the condition of a grant is express there is no need of reserving
a right of entry of a breach thereof in order to <m:thle the grantor to avail himself
of h.' See also Jackson VB. Allen, 3 Cowan, 220; Gl'ay 1'8. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 284;
Li tt.leton, Hec. :tn.
'' In<l<'<'<l, all the decided cases we can find, as well aA the text-books, are in harmony and to the same effect; so we do not present argument upon it here."
The estate is created by proper words of <loscript,ion declaring the conclition, :t1H1 tlw
lt>gal c-fl"oct of what fo11ows the breach is exactly the sanw whPther it lw clrscrihP!l in
the gr:Lrd, or not. Thus in the case n1Hlor couHidcr:1.tion the estate upon coudition tH
creat.P<l hy the Apceitic lnngnagc used. The legal etf,•ct of reversion followH tlw
hreach an<l <l<>claration of forfeitnro. No provision that tho lancl shonlcl revert waH
lWCCHHary, aJHl if added would simply have <lescribed the lega.l result of what prcct>dt><l it.
The Tonchstono, page 122, thus describes the operative words croati11g an rHt.atP on
condition:
"Conditions annexed to estates are sometimes so placed ancl confounded among cov~
na.nts, sometimeA AO ambiguously drawn, a.nd at all times havo in their drawing so
much aflinity with limitations, that it is har<l to discern and distinguish them. Know,
therefor<~, for the most part, conditions have conditional words in their frontispiece,
an<l do begin therewith, and that among these words there are three worlls that an•.
most proper, wl1 ich in their own nature aml efficacy, without any a<ldi tion of otlwr
wordH of rP-<'ntry in tho conclusion of the condition, clo make tho estate con,litiOJI:tl,
aA proviso, ita quod and 8/lb conditione."
Washburn, in his work on Real Property, marginal page 42, sayA:
"AnHmg tho forms of expression which imply a condition in a grant the writers
gin~ tho following: 'On condition,' 'providNl always,' 'if it shall so happen,' or • so
that, the gran t.oo pay, etc., within a specified time,' and grants made upon any of tht•se
tnrmH vnst a couditional eAtate in the grantee."
Wlwn t.l10 condition of a grant is express, there is no necessity of reserving a right of
ent.ry for hre:wh of tho condition, in order to enable the grantor to take advantage of it..
(.JaekAon 7'8. Allen,:~ Cow., 220; Gray vs. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 2B4.)
'l'hat tho words "upon condition," and oven words less specifically expressing tlw
intPnt, aro constrned as establishing an e.~tato upon cmHlition suhsecpwnt, without,
further clrscl'iption, is shown by many authorities. (Littleton, pp. 228, :3:.W, :J:1U, Com.
l>i~. Condition A 2; 2 Wood, Com. Powoll'A ed., 505,512, et seq.; Wheeler t•s. vValkcr, 2
Uoun., 201; Thomas V8. Record, 477 Mo., GOO; Sharon Iron Co. VB. Brin, 41 Penn. St.)
:~41; Taylor t•s. Cedar Rapids R. R. Co., 2!) Iowa, 371; Attorney-General vB. Merrimack
Uo., 14 Gray, (il2; Hadley vs. Hadley, 4 Gray, 145; Rawson VB. School District, 7 Allen,
12t3; Caw. VB. Hobertson, 1 Sclclen, 125; Pickle vs. McKissick, 21 Penn. St., 232; Iloop<>r
V8. Cummings, 45 Me., :~59; Chapin1•s. School, 35 N. H., 450; vViggin t'B. Berry, 2
FoHtl\r, 114; Haycl0n 1)8. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 5:34; Wright v.q. Tuttle, 4 Day, 326.)
Antl10riti<>s upon this point might ho multiplied. It is tho construction of prineiplo
:tlHl authority, a1Hl your committee have been referred to no case \Vhich in their judgment militates :tt all against tho position l1ero assumed. The Touchstone, at page 12~,
imrnndiatoly following the quotation which we have made, is suggested as modifying
thn ant.hority of tho citation in its applicn.bility to tho case nuder consideration. Bnt
no such om~ct can possibly be given the language used. After stating tho broad proposition quoted, tho writer proceeds to say that although the words mentioned are "the
moHt proper words to make conditions," yet that they are sometimes used for other
pnrposes. He them points out instances where the word "proviso" in certain particuhr rel:ttionR may be given a diiferen t meaning. But tho entire discussion is limited to
that part,icular word-does not once mention the words" 8nb conditione" or name a single im<tanco where thry are used in a sense contrary to the general rule, and even in
r<>spect. t.o t.hc wonl ''proviso" the exception could not apply to the case under cousid<'rn.tion, for it is expressly limited to a usc of the word where it does not stand "originally, by ancl of itself."
Tho other authorities to which we have heeu referred are not in any sense repugnant, to th(\ viev,. of the law we adopt. They are few in numbers, and at tho best
simply hold tha,t these apt words may, in certain instances, he restricted by immediate rcft>rrnc0 to other portions of the <lecd clearly expressing a di1fereut intent in the
gran tor. That this is true is not denied; hut it docs not change the general rule, and
it.H applicability to tho case under consideration will more properly be noticed hereafter.
vVo arc, t.lwrcforo, clearly of the opinion that section 8 of tho act, by tho express
language nHcd, created an estate upon condition Aubseqnont, forfeitable upon breach
of the condition.
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II.
Section 9 of the act, while perhaps embracing the preceding section within its provisions, and possibly to that extent cumulative, is also a provision prescribing certain
other and additional conditionA suhseqnont.
It will be noticed at the ont,sot that hy its Hpoeific language it embraces more than
one grant, the exact words b<•i11g "the several conditioned grants herein," and that it
relates to a ''further" condition. Tho "further" condition was that if the company
Rlwnld make any breach of "f.lte COJl(litions hereof" :ttHl tho same should continue
for a year, then the United States might, etc. Now, it iH ohviom; upon the more reacling that this langnagc 1locs not primarily relate to snction H, for that seetion only nplHHtains to one grant, needs no '' fnTtlwr '' condition, and the provision that the dcf:mlt
Rhonld continue for a year or upwards would have no pertine 1ee. This section oviflentl,y relatoR to Rome other condition than that mentioned in section H.
TheHe otlwr conditions or requirements are found in R<'ction G, wltich provideR that
Rix S(lparate and diRtinct things should he clone by tlw company, viz: 1st, tlmt tho road
Rlwuld ht> constrnctl~!t in a snhstantial and workmanliko manuPr, <~qnal in all re~p<·1·ts
to first·class milroa<l; 2d, that it should be mado of mils of the best quality, mannfactnrNl from American iron; 3d, tlutt a uniform gauge Hhonld he established tbroHg-hout, tho entire line; 4th, that the company shoul«l conRtrnct a tolegraph line of 1hn
moHt approved :tlHl suh~:~tantial d('scription ; Gth, that it shonhl not cha.rg<' tlw Un,·rrnment higher rateR than.indivi<lual~:~; and, 6th, M1at it Ahould pormi1; otl10r ra.ilroacls
to make running connoctionH 011 fair and reasonable tt·rmH. These aro tho otlwr antl
fnrthPr conclitions mentioned by soction 9, in default of any of wl1iclt, con1.inning tilr
a~ ear, CongroRR should have the right to "do any and all actA an<l thingH '' to Rocnre
the "RpP('dy completion of tho said road," as contomplatP<l an<l proYilled.
The intent of CongreRs, cxprcsse<l with abnnd:tnt precision in tlw act itself, and as
evr.ry one knowB as a matter of hiRtory, was to insnro tho construction within tit(' time
prnscrihcd of a, ~illhRtantia.l, tirst-class, and thoroughly-equipped railroacl from La lw Superior to the Pacilic, suitable and available in all enwrgencicH for usc by tlte Unit<·<l
States-in peace for the transmission of its mails; in war forth<' carrying of troopH a1Hl
supplies. Congress <lid not <lonato48,000,000acros of the public clom:tin to this company
without oxpccting anll requiring some equivalent. Among the things it (li<l reqniro was
the construction of a first-class road for the purposes an<l in the manner in<1icat.ed. It
, accor<lingly prescribed the various requirements above rPcited, and to ins11rc obodicnco
to its mandates it provided by section 9 that in default of any of the same Congr(•Rs
mip;ht do auything necessary to complete the road in the manner contemplate<l and
prescrihP<l. 'fhe enactment of these provisions would have been fntilo l1acl no r('Rl'rvation been made of a right to enforce them. Without such a reservation the Government, upon default of the company, would have had nothing left except a claim
~ainst the company for breach of contract or of covenant. 'l'o prevent such a condition of affairs tho right was reserved to further legislate to compel oboclience to it.s
malHla.tes. These requirements then became adclitional conditions subsequent which
Congress could enforce by forfeiture or by any other remedy deemed appropriate and
aclcquate. That was the object, scope, and intent of section 9, and it is expressed in
unambiguous phrase.
It is no anawer to this proposition to say that these requirements might be cnrorcc<l
hy the general forfmture provided by section 8.
The road might have been built within the time limited, and yet every ouc of those
conditions been broken. The grant could not then have been forfeited at all nnckr
.section H. A roacl would have been completed, and though built in absolute disrep;ar<l of all the requirements of section 5, the Government would have boon powerleAs
either to resume the grant or compel the company to perform tho condition. That
Rr.ction 9 relates to other conditions than that mentioned in section 8 is also apparent
frotll the use of the words ''and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year."
Th<'sc words, if applied to the conditions mentioned in section 5, mean something. If
appliNl to section 8 they are nonsensical. If Congress bad intended to exten<L tho
JH'rio(l moutioued in section 8 one year, it would have said July 4, 1877; not July 4,
lHiG, an<l another year thereafter.
It iR thns apparent that section 9 of the act has a scope and effect far beyond anything- embraced by section 8; that it legislated upon further and additional subjects;
haH a separate and distinct function of its own, and that instead of limiting or controlling the preceding section it creates additional obligations and liability on the
part of t.ho company.
The only answer to this position advanced by tbe company is the suggestion that
if thiK ho trno, then the two sections are utterly inconsistent with each other. It iA
d!ff~eult. to nnclnrstand how this can be S('rionsly urgO<l. We have already shown a
dillt•r(·nf. lngal Heope and operation for each un<lor tho construction we hnv•· a<loptc•<l.
TIH·.r :II'(' Pot l"l'llll~ll:l.nt. or inconsistent in tlw slightoHt clegn•e. E:wlt HtnndH for its
own part irnlar pnrpoH<'. On the other ha.ucl, tho construction coutoudocl fol' hy the
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company would violate well-established rules of construction Rim ply to disregard the
plainly expressed intent of Congress. They claim that the two sections should be
taken together, and that so taken all that Congress could do upon failure of the company to buil<l the road would be to take all necesf:lary steps to compel its completion,
without power to forfeit the grant.
This position is untenable under tho rules of construction because, first, it assnnl<'s
an ambiguity, and then to reconcile it rejects the usnal and ordinary signification of
terms and phrases; twice reads as singular a word in tho plural, and construes
''further condition" as if the word "furU10r" was omitted; second, with reference to
a simple time condition, viz, that the road should ho built by July 4, 11')76, it adds the
senseless expression, "provided tho same Rhall continnr nnhnilt one year;" third, it
excludes all of section 3 from its relations and connections with section 9, and either
rejects it entirely or makes it practically inoperative; fourth, it violates the manifest
general intent of the entire act and the gt>neral policy of Congress prevailing at the
time in respect to these grants.
Another consideration is to be noticeu. The provision of section ~IS permissive or
directory only. Congress may do all necessary things, etc. It is not mandatory, as
it would have been if intended as the sole remedy for the breach of tho condition of
section 8. So, too, it is not exclusive of other remedies for tho breach. CongreAs
may in that way enforce the forfeiture or may do it otherwise.
We have been referred to some authorities which arc supposed to sustain tho forced
construction of the act contended for, hut after the most careful examination of tlH•m
we are unable to recognize any doctrine contrary to that we have adopted for onr
guidance. The strongest cited are undonhtcdly the cases of the Episcopal Mission vs.
Appleton ctal. (17Mass., 326) andStanleyvs. Colt (5 Wall., lHl). 'l'heydonotostahlish any new doctrine or any principle repugnant to the authority of the long line of
cases we have cited.
In the former, the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking of a voluntary dceu
for charitable purposes, say:
"Although the words 'upon condition' in a conveyance of real estate arc apt words
to create a condition, any breach of which will forfeit the estate, yet they arc not to
be allowed that effect when the intention of the grantor, as manifested by tho whole
deed, is otherwise."
And in the latter, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of a devise for
certain charitable purposes, say:
''It is true the word 'proviso' is an appropriate one to constitnt.e a common-law
condition in a deed or will; but this is not the fixed and invariable meaning attached to it by the law in these instruments. On the contrary, it gives way to tho
intent of the parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, etc."
The principle announced by these decisions is simply the universal rule of construction l;Iving effect to the real intent of the parties to an instrument when the same can
be fauly ascertained from the language used; in other words, that technical expressions and phrases ordinarily yield to a contrary plainly cxproRsed intent. Bnt the principle has no applicability to the case under consideration, for there is no intent, either
expressed or to be reasonably implied, contrary to the technical meaning of the wortlH
"upon condition." On the contrary, the act from beginning tocll(l displays in every line
a most deliberate, well considered, and matured intention not to bestow this princely
gift without so circumscribing and limiting tho company by these cundi tions as to secure
the object, m1d every object, which Congress had in view. It shows tho clearest intention in the mind of Congress to create a condition subsequent forfe1ting the grant for.
failure to build the road within the prescribed period; and also otl10r conditions sn b ·
sequent, putting it in the power of Congress, even after the road had been built, to
enforce the requirements of the act touching the manner of its construction. In the
judgmeut of your committee there is not a word in tho act inuicative of an intent to
limit or curtail the technical words of condition used.
And aside from the language of the act itself, it is incredible that CongrcsR could
have intoude<l in this, probably the largest and most valuahlo grant of lands ever
made to a railroad company or a State, to depart from the uniform aud unintcrrnpt<·«l
policy of legislation for years, and allow the company to appropriate thiH \'aHt helL of
the pnhlic domain without restriction, reservation, or control. Your committee can
not subscribe to such a doctrine, ancl can find no argument, even plmiHihlr, to support
it. We are cleal'ly of opinion that Congress intcndccl to provide for a forf<\itnre upon
failnre to build the road within the proscribed period, a.ncl that tho language used was
abundantly sufficient in law to accomplish that intent.

III.
Your committee are also well satisfied that even unclcr sp,ction 9 of the act, in the
sense in which it iR construed by the company, CongrPSR hacl and has t.Jw powrr to
declare a forfeiture. It is coucede<l tltat muler it Vongres::; can do any :uul all acts
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a11cl 1h1ngH IH'e•lful and nocosAary to insure a speedy completion of the road. Congress
i:-; 111!' ~>ole and e. ·elw;i ve j udgo of wbother tho road ha1:1 at any time, in point of fact,

h,·•·u completed; and if not, what remedy should be applied. The remedy of forfeitincluded within tho general power reserved. The road is in fact uncompleted
to this day. Cougre~:~s can now, by virtue of that very reservation, 1:10 strenuously
msiHted upon by the company as protecting the grant, declare the ~:~ame forfeited and
restored to the public dowai11. Might not. the forfeiture ot' the grant in tho hands of
thiH compauy and the conl:lequeut creation of au opeulielu for equal compotitiou be~:;t
cumlnco to the tspccdy, ultimate completion of the en Lire line¥ If CongreiSI:I so view
t hll n atter, there cau be no doubt of it~:~ power to declare the forfeiture under the very
dauHe of the act relied upon by the company for itts protection.
ure i~:~

OTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST TilE l!'ORI!'EITUUE CONSIDERED.

C1Jrtain other considerations have been 1neseutcd to your committee, as objections
to declaring a forfeiture, which wo deem it proper to notice.
Fin; f.. It is argued that Congress having, by the joint resolution of May 31, 1870 (16
~Hat., :m;), authorized the company to is~:>ue boml~:> and execute a mortgage upon iLs
property and franchises, can not now do au act by which tho iuterestts of tho IJoudlwltlerts, or others claiming under tho mortgage, will be injuriously affected.
Tho argument is plausible, but not sound. It is correct in theory, but fallacious as
applied to the facts of the c~so under consideration. It rests upon the false assn111 ption
1hat Congress authorized a mortgage of tho unconditional fee, whcreats it did 11othiug
of the kind. It permitted a mortgage of "the property and rightts of property ol' all
kindt~ and descriptions" of the company.
The property and rights of property belonging to the company, so far aH itH l:t~uls
"ere concerned, was not the absolute, unconditional fee. It was the fen cha1·ged w 1Lh
the condition subsequent. That wa~:~ tho estate, and the only estate, which tho compauy owned, or which it was authorized to mortgage. Tho mortgagee took the etstale, as it was, charged with the condition. If no breach occurred the estate became
abt;olute; upon breach the forfeiture could bo enforced against the mortgagee afi well
as the mortgager. Congress, by the joint resolution, did not enlarge the grant; it
t:~iutply gave its assent to a mortgage of the grant as it stood.
The mortgagee took with his eyes open; received a d~feasible estate, the character
of which ho is presumed to have known; and he simply stands in his grantor'8 shoes
as re~:;pects tho question of forfeiture. This is well settled.
In Touchstone, at page 120, it is thus tersely stated:
"And if he that hath the estate grant or charge it, it will be subject to the condition
still; for the condition doth always atten<l and wait upon the estate or thing wbei·euuto it its annexed; so that although the same do pass through the hands of au huudrel.l men, yet it is subject to the condition still."
Aud again, at page 154:
"It is generally true that be that doth enter for a condition broken doth make the
el:ltate void ab initio, and that be tshall be in of hi~:> first etstate in the same course and
manner as it was w heu ho departed with the possestsion and at tho time of the making
uf the condition. And hence it is that, if there be any charge or ,incumbrance on the
lmuls, as if tho lessee of laud upon condition grant a rent charge out of tho laud or en tor
into a statuto orrecognizauce and the con usee has the laud in execution and this charge
il:l after the condition is made, in th11:1 case when tho condition is broken and the party
doth re-enter he shall by relation avoid the rent, statute, and recognizance and hold
the laud freed from them all."
Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property (vol. 2, pp. 44, 52) thus refers to tho question:
"Where a person enters for a condition broken tho estate becomes void ab initio;
the person who enters is again seized of his original estate in tho same manner as if
he had never conveyed it away. And as the entry of tho feoffer on the feoffee tor a
condition broken defeats the estate to which the condition was annexed, so it defeats
all rights and incidents anllf}Xed to that estate, together with all charges and incumbrances created by the feoffee during his possession; for upon the entry of the foofter
he becomes seized of an estate paramount to that which was subject to these charges."
Washburn on Real Property (vol. 2, p. 11, marg10al page 451) says:
"When such entry had been made the effect was to reduce the estate to the same
plight, aml to cause it to be held in the same terms as if the estate to which tho condition was annexed had not been granted."
And Kent thus states the same principle (vol. 4, p. 1~5):
"Persons who have an estate or freehold subject to a condition are seized and ma.y
convey, though the estate will continue defeasible until the condition be performed
or release, or is barred by the statute of limitation or by estoppel."
In Foxcroft t•s. Mallet (4 How., 377) the Supreme Court of the United States, speak·
in~ directly upon this very questwu, arising upon a mortgage of au estate upon coull!tion subsef(ueut, say;
"TLe condition, or charge, was on the laud as au mcurubrance by the very tenus
of the deed to him, and he could not, if he tried, convey a title to the land whiQb.
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should he fn·e from it. Snch a condition attachel:l to tho lantl wherever it g-ocl:l,
alLlwugh the s:tme ::;hould pa::;s through a hundred handl:l. In our view, it operatet>
like a covenant which runs with tho land, and all asl:ligneel:l are bound by covenants
!'cal that run whh tho land."
:::io, in the case under consideration, tho mortgagee took only the title of the mortgagor, charged with jt~:; defeasible quality. In the language of tho Supremo Court,
the mortgagor could not, if be tried, convey a title to the land which would be free
from the charge.
'I' he bondholders and others claiming under the mortgage simply stand in the shoes
of tho company. They could not and did not take auy greater or better estate tllau
their grantor held, aud that was an estate snbject to forfeiture for condition broken.
We have been furnishe(l with no a.nthorities containing a contrary view of thil:l
question, and we believe that none exi~:;t. In f~tet, the whole argumeut of the counsel
tor the company upou this point rests, al:l before stated, npon the erroueonl:l a~:;sump
tion that Congress in some way, by the joint resolution referred to, enlarged the
et,~tato of the company, or authorized them to mortgage a greater estate than tlley
thcrotofore pol:lscssed. As no foundation for such an assumption can be found, eitller
expressed or implied, in the joint resolution in questiou, it follows that the partie!:! are
ml(~gated to their rights as defined by the authorities we have cited, which are abso}ntely conclusive of tho whole controversy.
Secoml. It it:! said that Congress should not now declare a forfeiture because the
United States, as is alleged, did not seasonably comply with ,•;hat is doomed tL requirement of :;ection ~ of the granting act rela.tivc to the extinguishment of Indian titleb.
The pertinent portion of that section is in the following words:
"The Uuited States shall extinguish as rapidly as may lw conl:listent with public
policy ~Lnll the welfare of the said Indiaus, the Indian tHles to all lands falling under
the opemtion of this act and acquired in the donation to the road named iu this bill."
The Iwlian lauds in respect to which this complaint against the Government il:l
rai::;ed are a tract lying between the Red River of the North and the Jamol:l Uiver iu
Dakota; the Sioux Reservation in Dakota; tbe Crow Reservation in Montana; the
Cwur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho; and the Yakima. and Puyallup Reservation!:! iu
Wash ingtou Terri tory.
.
It is claimed that the provision of section 2, above quoted, required the United
States to extinguish the Indian title to these tracts, and that because this, ttl:! is
alleged, was not seasonably done, the company is released from the condition t,~nbse
q uont. To support this claim is cited the well-recognized rule that if the performance of a condition subsequent is rendered impossible by act of the grantor it becomes void.
It will he observed that the provision of law quotetl applies only to lands "falling
under the operation of the act and acquired in tho douation to the road named iu
thiH bill." None of the tracts named were acquired in the douation unless perhaps it
be the first one mentioned. By section 3 there arc excepted from the grant a.lllauds
"reserved, sold, granted, or otherwit,~e appropriated" at the time the line of tho road
wat,~ definitely fixed and a pla.t thereof filed in the General Laud Office. The earliest
definite location of auy portion of the road was in November, 1871 (Report of Commil:lt:~ioner of the General La.nd Office, 1873, p. 301). This was for that portion of the road
lying in Minnesota. The balance of the line has bccu definitely located since at diffenmt dates.
With reference to the first tract mentioned, viz, the land lying between the Red
River of theN orth and the James River iu Da.kota, it is admitted by the company and
the recordl:l show that the road was completed through these landb within tile time prescribed. The 11roposed forfeiture does not affect them, a.nd it il:l of course obvwus that,
if they fell within the terms of the ~rantmg act, the lud1an title was oue which tlid
nut embarrass the company or call for any actwn on the part of the United States.
\Vith reference to other tmctl:l mentioned, none of them were lands to which the
provision~:~ referred to applied, for they were "1·eservations" and '' app?·opt·ialed n as
t:~uch at tho date of the dufimte location of the road aud were not therefore '' acqmred
in the donation" by the company. They werti expressly excepted from tho douation
by tho third section of the act, autl were not, therefore, lands to which the proVIsiOn
under consideratiou, in any eveut, applied.
The Sioux Hcsorvatiou in D~1kota existed by Vlrtu.e orr various treaties, from an
early day to that of April 29, 18otl ( 15 Stat., 63b) i the Crow Reservation in Moutana
was made by treaty of May 71 18G8 (15 Stat., 650; see also Executive orders, October
2'), 1875, and May 8, 1876); the Crour d'Alene Heservation in Idaho was made by
Executive order of June 14, 1876, the Yak1ma by treaty of June 9? H355 (1~ Stat.,
}l. 9;.1), and the Puyallup hy treaty of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat., 1132). They wero all
reserved lands at the date of the definite location of the road, and excepted from the
grant aud the undert[~king of the Un;tctl States to extinguish the title. They were
(l.lso "appropriated" and therefore excepted. (See Willcox vs. Jackson, 13 Pet.; 4913.)
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It thus appears that with reference to one of these tracts tho road w:.tM completed
without any necesBity for aid from the United States within tho time required.; and
that with reference to all the others, the United States has never been under any
obligation to extinguish the Indian title at all.
llut even if such an obligation existed, it is too clear for argument that it was the
solo proviuce of the United States to determine when and under what circumstances
it should be discharged, conBistently with public policy and the welfare of the Indians.
Whatever may be individual views as to the 1>oliey of extinguishing those titles autl
tho incidental effect upon the welfare of tho Indians, it is entirely clear that Cougrcsl:l,
by unequivocal language, reserved to tho United States exclusively tho right to determine that question in relation to these lands. If she has not determined that
these titles can 11ow be extinguished consistently with public I>Olicy and tho welfare
of tho Indians, that ends the controvorBy. Neither the company nor any one else can
complain.
Tho position of the company upon this question amounts practically to a claim tl1at
they wcro entitled to tho assistance of the treaty and war-making power of the United
~tates whenever, in building t,heir road, they encountered opposition from tribes or
roving bands of Indians. In other words, that Congress not only douate(l them
48,000,000 acres of the public lauds, without limita,tion, restriction, or condition, but
ah:;o gave them tho use of tho treaty-making power and the Army whenever a roving
band of Indians iuterferod with their work. Your committee decline ~o adopt thiM
view of tho e<l.He, and, on the contrary, are clearly of the opinion t,bat Congress bad
110 snch iutent in the passage of the granting act, and that no justification tor such a
claim can be found in its tormB.
Third. It is further cl:tirne<l that the United States has not caused tho lands along
t!.:e line of the road to be surveyed a~:; required by the act, for want of w bich surveys
"settlement is hindered and retarded, alHL the compauy il:l thereby prevented from
selling or realiziug any benefit from its ummrveyed lauds."
Your committee aro uuable to see, even if all thil:l be true, how it in any way touches
tho question of the duty of the company to construct its line within the required
time. But it is not true that the Unite(l States is in default iu tho matter. The pro'Vision of the act referred to is as follows :
"That the President of the United States shall cause tho lands to be surveyed for
40 miles in width on both sides of tho entire line of said road, after the general route
l:ihall be fixed, and as fast as may be roquired by the construction of said road."
(Sec. G.)
Tho question as to when the surveys should be made, with reference to the construction of tho road, was loft eut,i rely to the discretion of the Presideut. If be at
auy time decided that further surveys were not required by the construction of the
road, or that the surveys were prosecuted as fast as was necesl:lary, then no right to
further surveys existed in the company. The lands, as your committee are advised,
were surveyed up to the time of the default iu 1879 as fast as, in any reasonable judgment, was required, aud we are satisfied that no inconvenience, from any delay in the
eurveys, retarded or l)reveuted the completion of the road.
Fourth. It is further contended that tho grant is not now forfoi table because of the
action of Congrcl:ls in tho passage of tho act approved July 10.1882 (2~ H. Stat., 157).
Tho grauting act contained two donations a:ffecting the public landl:l: first, a grant
of "aright of way" through "public lauds" (sec. 21); second, the ~mntof laud~:~
contained in Beetiou 3. Tho two grants arc entirely separate aud diBtinct, Illado by
two dilferont Bections, aud of two different estates. The former applied to all lauds
legally describe<! as "public," the latter only to certain odd sections of such lauds
:w.ot within named excoptious. Under the former, the company had a right to build
itli roa1l across any of such public lauds, and for that purpose had the usc of an oaseuwHt in ~00 feet ou each side of its track. Under the latter, it took in fcc the designah•ll sections. Juno :l5, 1881, the road was located over tho Crow Indian Rol:lervatiou,
alrca1ly bhowu not to have been included in tho granted lauds.
'l'lwreupou, AugnBt 2:t, 1881, a treaty or agreement was entered into between certain
special ageuts designated by tho Secretary of the Interior on tho ouo I>art and the
Crow Indians upon tho other, which agreement, so far al:l pertinent to tho prel:lent inquiry, is as followB:
''When a11 by section one of an act of Congress approved July second, eighteen hundre<l aud Hixty-fonr, entHled "An act granting lauds to ai<l in tho construction of a
railroad ami telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound, on tho Pacific coaBt,
by the northern route (thirteen Statutes at Large, pago three hundred and sixtyfive), tho Northern Pacific Railroad ()ompauy was authorized and ompOW<\rod to Jay
out, locate, construct, furnisl1, maintain, and enjoy a coutinuons railroad aml telegraph line, with the appurtenances, namely: Beghmiug at a, point on Lako Snporior,
in the State of Miuncsota or "Wisconsin; thence westerly hy the most, eligible milroad
route, al:l ~:~ball be deterntinod by said company, within tho territo~y u.f tb,.e United,
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Sta.tflA, ou a line north of the forty-fifth degree of latitude, to some point on Puget
Souud; all(L
"Wlwroas b~7 section two of said act of Congress granted to said company the right
of ·way for the construction of said railroad and telegraph line to the extent of two
lmudred feet iu width on each sitlo of s~tiU railroad whore it nuty pass through the
public do111ain, including all necessary grountl for st.atiou lmildiugs, workshops, depots, JJHWIJitte slwp~:~, swi1.clws, side-tracks, turn-tables, and wat('l' til:ttioHs; :tml
"Whereas, by aai1l auction two, Cougress provided th<Lt tho United States f:lhonltl
t> - tinguish as rapidly af:l may 1Je consistent with pul1lic policy antl tho welfare of thu
Indians the Indian titlef:l to all lauds falling under the operation of thif:l act aml acquirPd iu tho donat.iou to tho road name<l in the act; antl
'' Whoreas by treaty botwocn tlw lJuitetl Statel:! aml tho Crow Iudiaus, concluded
at Fort ]_;aramio May seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and duly ratified
and proclaimed (fifteenth Statntel:! at Largo, page six hundred and forty-nine), a district of country in the Territory of Montana was sot ap:trt af:l a. reservation for tho
absolute and undisturbed uf:le and occupation of the said Imliaus; and
"Whereas tlwre il:! no provil:!iou or stipulation in l:!aitl treaty authorizing saitl company or rocoguizi11g its right to construct its road through sai<l reservation ; and
"Whereasthe said companydi<l,on tho twenty-fifth dayofJuuo,cigltteeu huiHlre£1
and eighty-one, file iu the Department of Lhe Interior a map !!bowing tho definite locat.iou of its line of railroad from tho 0110 bnutlrod and !:leventh tlt1gree of longitude
west from Greenwich westwanlly through said rel:!ervation aml adjacent territory to
tho wel:!toru boundary to the l:!aid reserve, as l_)rovidetl by said act of eighteen hundred and l:!ixty-four, tho company haviug first obtained the permission of tho Secretary oft.he Interior to l:!urvey its line in said reservation; and
"vVhoreas the said company desirel:! to construct itf:lline of railroad upon such dosiguate<L route, arHl chtims the right by virtue of sai(l act so to do:
"Now, therefore, in order to fulfill tho obligatioul:! of tho Government in tho premise8, this agreement * * ,. witnesseth:
"That for tho consideration hereinafter mentioned tho Crow tribe of Iutlia.us do
hereby surrender and relinquish to tho United StaLl's all their right, title, and intorcf:lt iu and to all that part of tho Crow Reservation situate in tho Territory of Montana and tlescribod as follows, namely:
"A st.rip of land not exceeding 400 feet in width, that is to say, 200 foot on each
side of t,ho line laid dowu on the map of definite location hereinbefore meutioned,
wherever s~dd lino runs through said rm;orvation between the orw hnmlre•l and ilevouth degree of longitude west of Greenwich on the eaf:lt, au(l tho mid-channel of the
Big Boulder I~iver on the west, containing :five thousand three hundred aml eightyfour acros, more or less. * "" *
"It is further stipulated and agreed tlw.t tho United States will not permit the sa.id
railroad company, its employes, or agents to trel:!pa.!!s upon any part of the lauds of
the Crow Indian H.eservatiouuot hereby relinquished, nor permit said company, its
t'mploy6f:l, or agents to cut a.uy timber, wood, or hay from the lauds embraced iu said
rel:!ervation."
July 10, 1882 (2'2 Stat., 157), Congress passed au act ratifying and conii.rming thil:!
agreement.
Tho act first recited tho agreement in extenso, and then provided as follows:
"SEc 3. That tho right of way over the lmHl rclinqui~:~hetl by said agreernen t to
the United States for the construction of said Northern Pacific Railroad, aml the U!:!O
of the several parcels of land so reliuquishotl intended to be used for depots, statiom~,
sidings, and l:!o forth, for said railroad, are hereby granted to f:laid Northern PaciJic
l~ailroad Company, its successors, and assigns, for tho uscl:! and purposes iu said
agremnent sot forth."
It is claimed t.hat by these proceedings the United States waived tho broach of
coJHl i tion.
As hereinbefore l:!tated relative to another branch of tho case, this argument ill
plausible but not sound. It ignores entirely tho fact to which we have adverted,
vi>~, that tho act contained two grants, one for the right of way and another in fee of
the odd l:!cctions, and overlooks tho fact that these proceedings related solely to the
former.
The Crow treaty and act ratifying it are specifically limited to and operate only
upon tho right of way. This is shown beyond all question hy a bare inspection of
the l:!tatnto. Neither tho agreement nor the act contains a !lingle word or expression
that could be tortured in to a recognition of the continued existence of the land grant
or as a. waiver of the forfeiture thereof.
Their only scope and operation is to extinguish the Indian title for the purpose of
making the right of way available. In this there is nothing whatever inconsistent
with the idea of a forfeiture of the land grant and its declaration at any time by Congress.
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The situation was anomalous. This munificent donation was then subject to forfeiture for breach of the condition. A due regard for the rights of the Government
and its announced policy of dedicating the public 'lands for all time to come to actual
settlers under general laws, demanded an enforcement of the forfeiture. But the
company, pushing its line toward the Pacific, encountered difficulties at this point in
respect to its right of way, not as to its grant of land, for, as already sllown, it bad
no grant of land on the reservation. No reasons of public policy demanded a forfeiture of its right of way, granted by the act as a separate and distinct concession;
but, on the other hand, the most eulighten(>d policy dictated its recognition. Hence
Congress and the execntive branch of the Government extinguished the Indian title
as to the right of way, carefully limiting all that was done to that one grant. In
this, as before stated, there was nothing, in the judgment of your committee, inconsistent with a clear and well-defined intent to insist upon the breach of condition as
to the grant of the odd sections in fee.
The Indian title was the mere right of occupancy; protected by treaty or reservation it remains the same; in either event the lands were public lands of the United
States. The United States did not grant these to the company, but expressly reserved
and exempted them from its donation. It could, and did, however, give the company
a right of way through them. Such right it would always give in a proper case.
'That the recognition of a former grant of that kind or even a new grant thereof can
be considered as a waiver of breach of another grant, of a separate and distinct
estate, is, in the judgment of your committee, an untenable -position. It would violate the obvious intent of Congress, as shown in all its legislation affecting the grant,
and leave this immense a~:ea of the public domain irrevoc~1bly consecra,t,ed to this
corporation, without restriction or control even to accomplish the simplest object of
its creation. That Congress, by the act of 1882, intended any such result as• that is
beyond the credence of your commith-'e. \Ve think it was intend(>d merely to confirm
the right of way, and that nothing in t.he proecedings taken for that purpose legally
operated as a waiver of the reserved rights of the United States as to the grant of
lands.
The doctrine of implied waiver invoked by the company has its foundation in principles analogous to those of estoppel in pais. The grantor, by virtue of somethin~ he
has said or done, is, according to the Justice or right of the matter, prohibited from
asserting anything to the contrary. As between intlividnals, occupyiug t.hA position
of grantor and grantee, in a deed upon condition subsequent, it is estoppel, pure and
simple, that enforces an implied waiver of the breach; and, although estoppel can not
be pleaded against t.he Government, for the sake of the argument we may admit that
the United States, speaking and acting by its proper agents, might be placed in a
position where in justice and equity it sbonld not deny what it bas before asserted to
be true. In every such case, however, the underlying principle is that of estoppel
between individuals. If the circumstauces would not, between individuals, amount
to an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, then a fortiori the Government is not
bound.
Applying these criteria to the question now under consideration and it is entirely
clear that there was no waiver of the breach.
"An estoppel by matter in pais may be defined as an iudispntable admission, arisinO'
from the circui.UIStance that the party claiming the benefit of it has, while actin•,. i~
good faith, been induced, by the voluntary intelligent action of the party against
whom it is alleged, to change his position." (Bigelow on Estoppel, 2 ed., p. 345.)
It is founded in the doctrine of equity that if a representation be made to anothPr
who deals upon the faith of it, the former shall make t.he representation good if' h~
knew it to be false. (Bigelow ou Estoppel, p. 4:31; Evans 'I.'S. Bicknall, 6 Ves., 174 18:-t;
Slim t•s. Concber, 1 De G., F. & J., 518; Lee vs. Monroe, 7 Ch., 366.)
'
To el'!tablisb it, it is necessary to show not only the fact of a misrepresentation or
concealment, bnt also that it was material to the interests of the varty and actually
misled him. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 431, 1 Story, Eq. Jur., par. HH.)
All the following elements must be present in any transaction in order to create an
estoppel by conduct:
1. Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.
2. The representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts.
3. The party claiming the e!'ltoppel must have been ignorant of the fact.
4. The misrcpresentatiou must have been made with intent that the other party
should act upon it.
5. The party clairuing must have been induced to act upon it. (Bigelow onEstoppel, p. 4:37.)
Hence, as a general rule, fraud is necessary to the existence of an estoppel by conduct. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 467.)
In general, where there is nothing to show that a representation was intended to be
acted upon as a statement of the truth or that it was tantamount to a promise or aO'reement, amounting to an undertaking to respond iq case of its falsity, the party i~ no~
H.Rep.a-2~
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estopped. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 486; Danforth vs. Adams, 29 Conn., 107; Farist's
appeal, 39 Conn., 150; McAdams vs. Hawes, 9 Bush, 15; Zuchtmann vs. Roberts, 109
Mass., 5:3; Kerhl vs. Jersey City, 8 C. E. Green, 84; Muller 'I.'S. Pondir, 55 N. Y., 325;
Davis vs. Smith, 43 Vt., 2ti9.)
And unless such a misrepresentation is in fact exclusively acted upon so that the
position of the party is changed as to his material interests, there can be no estoppel.
(Bigelow on Estoppel, pp. 49:l, 493; Howard vs. Hudson, 2 El. & B., 1; McCance t•s. L.
& N. W. R. R. Co., 7 Hurl. & N., 477; Schmaltz vs. Avery, 16 Q. B., 655; Boker vs.
Johnston, :ll Mich., 319-345.)
Now, there was absolutely no misrepresentation whatever of any fact, material or
immaterial, on the part of the United States; there was no intention to have the company do or omit to do anything whatever on account of any representations, false or
true; there was no action whatever by the company induced by or founded upon any
such representation; and the company bas never in any respect changed its position
-to its prejudice.
Not one of the prerequisites of an estoppel by conduct is to be found in the entire
transaction.
What was there in the transaction amounting to a fraud upon the company, or a
promise amounting to an undertaking to make good any representation T What ha11
the company done to change its position f How has it been prejudiced f
One general rule can be deduced from all the authorities, viz, that unless one party
to the transaction intends to make some representation or extend some assurance and
the other party to the transaction so understands, accepts, and acts, to his prejudice,
then there is no estoppel. Your 0ommittee..are entirely satisfied that in this transaction
no such intention as waiving the breach of condition existed in the mind of Congress;
that no such understanding of the position of Congress was entertained by the company; and, that instead of doing anything to their prejudice in consequence of such
proceedings, the company obtained new privHeges and l'ights of great value. Under
the very act which they now say estops the United States they lost nothing; did no
act in consequence that prejudiced them in the least·; and, on the other hand, secured
the right of way acros.'! the reservation. It is thus clear that, treated even from the
standpoint of an estoppel, there was no waiver of the breach of condition.
To conclude, we refer to the following principles and authorities showing that mere
indulgence or silence can not be construed into a waiver of a breach of condition.
(Gray '1.'8. Blanchard, 8 Pickering, 284, 292; Washburn ~ section 19.) Laches can not
be imputed to the Government or itl'! officers (7 Otto, 5!;4), and especially" in a representative Government where the people do not and can not act in a body, where their
power is delegated to others, and must be exercised. lf at all.'' (8 Otto, 489; to same
effect see 9 Wheaton, 720; 11 Wheaton, 184 ; 4 McLean, 567; 5 McLean, 133; 1 Peters,
318; 8 Wallace, 269-27 4 ; 5 Otto, 316.)
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